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MOHAMED A. G. BAKHIT
THE CITIZENSHIP DILEMMA 
 OF SOUTHERN SUDANESE COMMUNITIES IN 
THE POST-SECESSION ERA IN KHARTOUM
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to investigate the processes of citizenship changes for South Sudanese citizens who were previously formally considered to 
be Sudanese citizens and have remained residents of Khartoum’s shantytowns 
since South Sudan gained independence in 2011. 
The paper argues that there are currently two types of citizenship for the 
Southern Sudanese communities in Khartoum – legal citizenship and ‘commu-
nity’ citizenship – and that this has allowed considerable numbers of people 
who do not enjoy legal citizenship to survive and support their social lives 
through community citizenship. ‘Community citizenship’ status differs from 
legal citizenship in terms of its dynamics and evolution, by which it is negoti-
ated, constructed, and communicated through the interactions of Southern 
Sudanese people on a daily basis.
To what extent does this community citizenship give these people what 
they need, and to what degree can it protect them? These are the questions 
this paper will attempt to answer.
INTRODUCTION
After six decades of struggle for independence and two civil wars, South 
Sudan recently became Africa’s newest state and the 193rd member of the 
United Nations. In practice, however, for the Southern Sudanese residents of 
Sudan, the question of whether an individual becomes a citizen of the new 
country or remains a citizen of the Republic of Sudan has been an intricate 
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socio-political question, a complex legal issue, and a practical matter of 
rights, documents, relocation, and personal attachments.
“Between 1983 and 1991, close to 3 million people were estimated to 
have been displaced from the South. By mid 1991, some 425,000 of them 
had taken refuge in Uganda and Ethiopia. The remainder locked to southern 
cities, such as Juba and Malakal, and an estimated 2.3 million southerners 
took refuge in the North, of whom 1.8 million settled in Greater Khartoum” 
(de Geoffroy 2007: 6-7). The favoured destination clearly shifted towards 
Khartoum during this period as the dimensions of displacement mushroomed. 
When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed a decade later 
(2005), ending the civil war in Sudan and paving the way for the independ-
ence of South Sudan, the majority of internally displaced Southern Sudanese 
were still resident in Khartoum’s shantytowns 1.
The data gathered from my second PhD ieldwork 2 in Al-Baraka shanty-
town in Khartoum – where South Sudanese people form the second largest 
ethnic group – suggest that the decision taken by thousands of South Sudanese 
shantytown settlers both before and after the referendum (January 2011) and 
South Sudan’s oficial independence of (July 2011) to return to South Sudan 
was informed by numerous factors, which include: 
– Sentiments of Southern Sudanese nationality: many informants told me 
very proudly: ‘we are Southern Sudanese people; we no longer belong to 
Sudan’. 
– The negative life experiences of Southern people in the North because they 
found themselves at the bottom of the urban social hierarchy, and due to 
racism. Many Southern people expressed the feeling that they are treated as 
‘second class citizens in Khartoum’. 
– Post-referendum pressure from the government of Sudan, which dismissed 
Southern Sudanese employees from their formal jobs in the public and pri-
vate sectors, treated them as foreigners, and put pressure on the government 
of South Sudan in the political negotiations over secession.
1. See map no. 1.
2. For my ieldwork, I rented two houses in different quarters of Al Baraka (No. 2, 
and No. 4), each for six months (April-September 2010, and October 2011-March 
2012 respectively), and sought to follow the daily lives, activities, and events of vari-
ous groups and individuals living in those areas.
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In a previous work, 3 I argued that the decision to return to South Sudan 
was predominantly informed by the lifestyles and life experiences of 
Southerners in the shantytowns of Khartoum. First-generation residents were 
more likely to decide to return irst, and forced migrants also tended to return 
to the South as soon as possible, as happened when many people returned to 
their rural home areas immediately after the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement in 2005. Many economic migrants preferred to return to 
urban areas of South Sudan to utilize their work experiences in formal jobs. 
Second-generation young people and educated people generally returned to 
Juba, the capital of South Sudan. 
As a part of the process of secession of the Republic of South Sudan from 
the Republic of Sudan in 2011, people of South Sudanese origin who had 
been resident in the Republic of Sudan for decades were stripped of their 
Sudanese citizenship and normal livelihoods, 4 irrespective of their connec-
tions with either state, and regardless of their views on which State they 
wished to belong to. These people now face the dilemma of lacking any 
recognized legal status in Sudan, and live with the constant risk of being 
arrested and charged with violating immigration laws, with the threat of 
expulsion to South Sudan (Sanderson 2014: 74, UNHCR 2010: 13). It is 
very possible that some of those people who are considered by the Sudanese 
government to be South Sudanese citizens might in the end ind themselves 
without recognized citizenship of either state, essentially leaving them 
stateless (Manby 2012: 4).
Many are currently living in a state of anxiety, as they have lost their for-
mal or informal jobs in the public and private sectors and are facing challenges 
to the maintenance of their rights to their homes and other property (the 
Sudanese Constitution only grants the right of property ownership to Sudanese 
nationals). In some instances, children have been refused entry to schools or 
3. This argument was made in a paper entitled: ‘Life Construction in Al-Baraka 
Shantytown: the decision to return back to South Sudan’, presented at the Conference 
of the African Studies Association in Germany (VAD) - Bayreuth University, June 
11-14 2014, Bayreuth, Germany.
4. In August 2011, the Sudanese government approved an amendment to the Sudan 
Nationality Act 1994 according to which any individual who acquires South Sudanese 
nationality de jure or de facto automatically loses his or her Sudanese nationality, 
while the South Sudan Nationality Act 2011 attributes South Sudanese nationality to 
individuals with one parent, grandparent or great-grandparent who was born in 
South Sudan, to individuals belonging to one of the “indigenous ethnic communities 
of South Sudan”, and to those who (or whose parents or grandparents) have been 
habitual residents of South Sudan since 1956, the date of Sudanese independence 
(Manby 2012 : 2-3).
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treatment at clinics unless they pay higher fees, like other foreigners in 
Khartoum 5 (Interview with Andrea in Khartoum, 10/12/2015). 
WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP?
There is a general consensus among most political theorists that citizen-
ship is both a status acquired through being a member of a collectivity (usually 
the State), and a system of rights and obligations built upon ideas of equality, 
justice, and solidarity (Keller 2014 : 19).
While the irst part of this deinition focuses on the legal and institutional 
aspects of membership 6, which is a dominant theme in most citizenship stud-
ies, the second is always complex and heavily contested, due to the fact that 
there are differing views as to the nature of the rights and obligations of citi-
zenship and to what extent this system might achieve equality and justice. My 
focus in this paper will be on the social and cultural aspects of this concept of 
citizenship, which is closely tied to the questions of “collectivity”, “commu-
nity” and “membership”; this is precisely what makes it important to link the 
concept of citizenship with concepts of identity and nationality.
At the same time, however, we need to keep the distinction between the 
concepts of identity and citizenship in mind. While identity may be shared by 
people from several different states, citizenship always refers to people who 
belong to a single modern state. Although the distinction between ideas of 
citizenship and nationality is not always a clear one, in many studies and in 
normative usage nationality can be used to refer to a legal relationship 
between an individual and a State (Abdulbari 2011: 158), which makes the 
concept of nationality virtually synonymous with that of citizenship. 7 
Following Miller (Miller 2002 : 3), there are three schools of thought in 
Western literature on the concept of citizenship that developed within the 
5. The city of Khartoum is also home to large numbers of migrants and refugees from 
neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea.
6. The focus here is on how they are becoming members, how they can acquire this 
membership, and what kinds of duties and rights might be generated in legal and 
institutional terms. 
7. A rather signiicant theoretical discussion is under way on the relations between the 
concepts of nationality, identity, citizenship, and state. See, for example: Eriksen, Thomas 
Hylland. 1993. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto 
Press; Dorman, Sara, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent (eds). 2007. Making Nations, 
Creating Strangers: State and Citizenship in Africa. Leiden: Brill; Brubaker, Rogers. 2008. 
“Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism” Ann. Rev. Sociol. 35: 21–42; and Miller, David. 
2002. Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
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institution of modern States in Western Europe during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.
– Liberal-Individualism: this school stresses the autonomy of the individual 
citizen. Members of a State have a duty to respect the rights of others with-
out any further obligations to society other than those established on this 
contractual basis. The contract based upon the rights of the individual with 
the state is primarily to pay taxes and defend it. The liberal tradition main-
tains that citizens share a belief in common rules that govern how they live 
together in a society without having a shared belief in a substantive com-
mon good. The idea of the common good is considered to be opposed to 
the pluralism of liberal democracy. “It is therefore important to acknowl-
edge the speciicity of modern democracy and the central role played in it 
by pluralism. By this I mean the recognition of individual freedom, that 
freedom which John Stuart Mill defends in his essay “On Liberty” and 
which he deines as the possibility for every individual to pursue happiness 
as he sees it, to set his own goals and to attempt to achieve them in his 
own way” (Mouffe 1992: 29).
– Civic-Republican: this school of thought derives from the French 
Revolution, during which the notion of fraternity and the shared experience 
of participation in a united political community gained popularity. Thus, a 
reliance on common values through patriotism and loyalty and an associa-
tion through shared experiences of local community are crucial for civil 
citizenship. This means that the notion of common good lies at the heart of 
this concept of citizenship. In civic citizenship, individuals are considered 
as citizens only insofar as they are members of a community, and what 
makes individuals citizens is a shared commitment to a common good. 
– Social Rights of Citizenship: this school of thought was developed by the 
British sociologist Thomas H. Marshall (1893–1982) (Grest 2000: 4), who 
identiied the three elements of citizenship as civil, political, and social 
rights. His central point was that citizens are all equal, and that social 
rights embody a whole range of concepts, from the right to a modicum of 
economic welfare and security to the right to share a social heritage and 
live the life of a civilized human being, according to the prevailing stand-
ards in the society. The importance of Marshall’s contribution lies in its 
powerful inluence on the formation of the Welfare State in Britain, where 
the idea of social citizenship helped recognize the injustices of the capital-
ist system at the time. 
In summary, modern western concepts of citizenship are historically con-
structed from a set of rights and duties related to work and public service 
(such as the military or judicial services). This model of citizenship as a social 
right has been closely associated with Thomas Marshall’s legacy, although 
“Marshallian citizenship has been subject to extensive criticism over the last 
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two decades and the social model of citizenship has been expanded and 
deepened by approaches that emphasize the lexibility of social membership, 
the limitations of citizenship merely as rights, and by perspectives that empha-
size identity and difference” (Turner 1997: 5).
The situation is very different in Africa: with the absence of a modern and 
democratic civic culture, many aspects of the rights and obligations set forth 
in constitutions and state laws are only on paper, and are not usually trans-
lated into rights in practice (Grest 2000: 4). Many countries, including the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and 
Uganda, still maintain an explicitly racial or ethnic basis for citizenship 
(Manby 2011:11). 8 In most other African countries today, however, as in the 
legal systems of most other modern states, the blood tie, or “jus sanguinis”, 
principle has lost its ethnic basis: citizenship is generally granted to those who 
are born to a parent who is a citizen, including one who has acquired citizen-
ship by naturalization and may not be of the same ethnicity as the dominant 
group (Abdulbari 2011: 160-161), or those who are born from mixed ethnici-
ties. The Sudanese Constitutions of 1998 and 2005 follow this more moderate 
position, as noted by Marko, who states: “up until the secession of South 
Sudan in 2011, citizenship followed the logic of ‘jus sanguinis’, without 
directly excluding ethnic groups from the imagined political body of Sudan” 
(Marko 2015 : 4).
Numerous previous experiences of an arbitrary stripping of nationality 
have made the international community aware of the seriousness of the prob-
lem and have promoted efforts to address this situation of statelessness, as 
with the recent Eritrea-Ethiopia experience, when thousands were expelled 
from Ethiopia to Eritrea and vice versa (Abdulbari 2011: 172).
LEGAL CITIZENSHIP VERSUS ‘COMMUNITY’ CITIZENSHIP FOR 
THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE IN KHARTOUM
While in practice the current challenge for citizenship of Sudan and South 
Sudan is the presence of thousands of Southern Sudanese in Sudan with no 
legal citizenship status, I argue here that there is a need to differentiate 
between two types of citizenship for Southern Sudanese people in Khartoum 
(legal citizenship, and ‘community’ citizenship).
8. National laws generally distinguish types of citizenship, with different rules for 
those acquiring citizenship by birth and those obtaining citizenship by a process of 
naturalisation. Citizenship by birth can be deined by the place of birth (jus soli) or by 
ancestry (jus sanguinis). Countries that follow a jus sanguinis policy grant citizenship 
based on ancestry or ethnicity, while countries that apply the jus soli grant citizenship 
to anyone born in the territory of the state (Assal 2011: 3).
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The main feature of the literature on the citizenship of South Sudanese 
people in Sudan is its focus on their legal and formal status as non-citizens; 9 
however, very little attention has been paid to the social and cultural aspects 
of this new legal status, and how Southern Sudanese people deal with it in 
their daily struggles.
From a theoretical standpoint, the differentiation between legal citizenship 
and ‘community’ citizenship can be traced back to the inluential work of 
Mamdani (Mamdani 1996), who argues that colonialism in Africa created two 
categories of people – citizens and subjects or, as they are sometimes referred 
to, citizens and natives. While natives were bound to their rural ‘ethnic 
groups’ and spoke the language of tradition and custom, citizens were usually 
those living in urban areas and ruled by rights, duties, and privileges. 
Mamdani claims that these particular historical and political formulations 
came to deine the way citizenship was perceived in post-colonial Africa: on 
the one hand, African central states are governed by civil law and formal insti-
tutions – the domain of the national elites – while on the other, the local state 
or native authorities enforce laws based on custom. The former is the realm of 
the rights and duties associated with legal citizenship, while the latter is the 
realm of culture and custom. Therefore, Mamdani and Comaroff argue, 
natives are engaged by the state as subjects, and as such are not entitled to the 
rights and beneits of citizenship, 10 which means that “life as national citizen 
and life as ethnic subject are as likely to run up against one another – often in 
contradictory ways – thus making political personhood a fractured, fractal 
experience” (Comaroff 2010).
If one adopts this approach, it appears that there has been little change in 
the relationship between the African state and its citizens since the time of 
colonization, as Mamdani has emphasised. I would argue that this dual type 
of citizenship (legal citizenship and ‘community’ citizenship) has allowed 
considerable numbers of people to be excluded from legal citizenship and to 
9. For example, Bronwen Manby has written three books on citizenship law in Africa 
and Sudan: Citizenship Law in Africa: A Comparative Study, (Open Society Foundations, 
2nd Edition, 2010); Struggles for Citizenship in Africa (Zed Books, 2009); and The 
Right to a Nationality and the Secession of South Sudan: A Commentary on the New 
Laws (Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa 2012). See also Assal, Munzoul A. M. 
2011. Nationality and Citizenship Questions in Sudan after the Southern Sudan 
Referendum Vote. Sudan Report 1. Chr. Michelsen Institute. For a mainly legal and 
constitutional perspective, see Abdulbari, Nasredeen. 2011. “Citizenship Rules in 
Sudan and Post-Secession Problems.” Journal of African Law, 55 (2): 157-180.
10. Perhaps it is inevitable that a dual approach such as this will be complicated, as 
it has been shown in many studies that sharp differentiations such as rural/urban, 
traditional/modern, custom/law are rarely useful for explaining complex hybrid 
African realities.  
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survive and sustain their social and economic life through ‘community’ citi-
zenship. Whether this ‘community’ citizenship status is able to substitute – or 
even perhaps complement – legal citizenship, and more importantly, the ways 
in which the community of Southern Sudanese in Sudan have been able to 
construct and negotiate this ‘community’ citizenship, will be the focus of the 
remainder of this paper. 
LEGAL CITIZENSHIP
Legal citizenship is the legal status of being a member of a state according 
to international and national legal procedures and as evidenced by state insti-
tutions, which grants certain rights and obligations, largely involving state 
institutions. Of course, many Southern Sudanese living in Khartoum currently 
lack this type of citizenship.
The estimated numbers of Southern Sudanese affected by this form of 
statelessness range between 500,000 and 700,000, a igure that includes 
those who are currently estimated to be affected as well as those who are 
‘obviously’ 11 South Sudanese according to the normative interpretation 
(Manby 2012: 4). If the most recent amendments to the Sudan Nationality Act 
(2011) were to be applied on a comprehensive scale, they would lead to a 
loss of Sudanese nationality for a very signiicant number of people, including 
those with weak links to South Sudan, who have usually developed close 
links to the Republic of Sudan.
The Sudanese nationality law ignores the distinction between ethnic origin 
and the rights granted by the State. Accordingly, the law lays emphasis on 
ancestry (jus sanguinis), while citizenship by naturalisation is popularly con-
sidered to be an inferior status. 12 Sudan and South Sudan still use ethnic 
belonging as a primary basis for citizenship claims, although they are both 
among the most multicultural and ethnically diverse countries in Africa. 
Having a Sudanese or South Sudanese national birth certiicate is generally 
considered to be insuficient proof of ethnic or territorial belonging. It is also 
harder for members of ethnic groups and minorities living near national 
11. ‘Obviously’ in terms of their direct belonging to South Sudan territory, which is 
also used in the South Sudan Nationality Act 2011, which attributes South Sudanese 
nationality to individuals with one parent, grandparent or great-grandparent born in 
South Sudan, to individuals belonging to one of the “indigenous ethnic communities 
of South Sudan”, and to those who (or whose parents or grandparents) have been 
habitual residents of South Sudan since 1956, the date of Sudanese independence.
12. A senior Sudanese immigration oficer has stated that “nationality by birth gives 
more rights than nationality by naturalization” (Assal 2011: 3).
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borders to obtain nationality certiicates or other identity documents, espe-
cially if they maintain links with neighbouring countries. 
According to the Sudanese Nationality Law of 1957, which was amended 
in 1974 and 1994, nationality is based on descent, with the possibility of nat-
uralization. Under this law, it will now be extremely dificult for Southern 
Sudanese people to gain citizenship of Sudan (Sikainga 2011: 17). 13 In South 
Sudan, on the other hand, according to Section 8 of the 2011 Nationality Act, 
South Sudanese nationality by birth can be based on ive separate grounds 14. 
The Act states that South Sudanese citizenship can be automatically obtained 
by eligible individuals regardless of their current residence (Scherr 2012: 
101). “The combined effect of both laws is to ‘renationalize’ individuals with 
ethnic and familial afinities with South Sudan to South Sudanese nationality. 
It is not uncommon to denationalize someone following his or her voluntary 
acquisition or retention of a foreign nationality. However, it is very unusual to 
denationalize someone following his or her involuntary acquisition of a for-
eign nationality” (Sanderson 2014 : 74-75).
It is widely acknowledged that there is a lack of proper population regis-
tration systems in both South Sudan and Sudan, including with regard to birth 
certiicates, identity papers, and marriage certiicates. This makes it dificult to 
provide proof that a parent, grandparent or great-grandparent was born or 
lived in South Sudan, which is one of the conditions for acquisition of nation-
ality of the new state of South Sudan (Manby 2012 : 4).
13. See the amended Sudanese Nationality Act 1994 and the South Sudanese 
Nationality Act 2011 in the footnote on page 2.
14. Article 8 of the new South Sudanese Nationality Act (SSNA), which was adopted 
in June 2011 just before the secession of South Sudan, provides that: (1) A person 
born before or after this Act has entered into force shall be considered a South 
Sudanese National by birth if such person meets any of the following requirements 
— (a) any parents, grandparents or great-grandparents of such a person, on the male 
or female line, were born in South Sudan; or (b) such person belongs to one of the 
indigenous ethnic communities of South Sudan. (2) A person shall be considered a 
South Sudanese National by birth, if at the time of the coming into force of this Act 
— (a) he or she has been domiciled in South Sudan since 1.1.1956; or (b) if any of 
his or her parents or grandparents have been domiciled in South Sudan since 
1.1.1956. (3) A person born after the commencement of this Act shall be a South 
Sudanese National by birth if his or her father or mother was a South Sudanese 
National by birth or naturalization at the time of the birth of such a person. (4) A 
person who is or was irst found in South Sudan as a deserted infant of unknown 
Parents shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to be a South Sudanese National 
by birth (Manby 2012: 25).
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‘COMMUNITY’ CITIZENSHIP
‘Community’ citizenship refers to all kinds of protections and services that 
individuals may acquire by being a recognized member of a local commu-
nity. This type of citizenship does not necessarily bear any relationship to a 
person’s legal citizenship, in the sense that if individuals have acquired ‘com-
munity’ citizenship status, it might entitle them to satisfy all their rights and 
requirements without the need for legal citizenship. In my view, many mem-
bers of the South Sudanese community in Khartoum have acquired community 
citizenship by living in Khartoum (mainly in peripheral shantytowns) for many 
decades before the secession of South Sudan.
Since the civil war broke out in the South in mid-1983, it has displaced 
about 4 million people from South Sudan, of whom 1.5 million have ended 
up in the capital (Nilsson 2000: 9). When these populations reached 
Khartoum, they found that the situation was no less dificult than it had been 
in their home areas, other than their physical security: at the time of mass dis-
placement, the capital was in deep economic recession: less than 30 per cent 
of industrial capacity was being used – industrial labour being the main 
source of jobs for rural migrants – and inlation and declining real wages were 
affecting the remainder of the city’s population. Long queues to obtain bread 
and food riots were both frequent, coinciding with the inability of the munic-
ipalities and local government councils to provide basic services due to 
budget cuts (Akoy 1994: 13-14). 
Not all the residents of the shantytowns were IDPs affected by conlicts and 
famines in the Western and Southern regions of Sudan. Others had settled in 
the city earlier, starting in the 1960s. In a joint survey conducted by a group of 
NGOs in 2003 covering all major shantytowns in Khartoum, it was found that 
“the major ethnic groups are Dinka and Nuba (representing 25.4% and 20.6% 
of the households respectively). 15 Arab ethnic groups (including Misiri) make 
up 14% of the IDP households and Fur 13.1%. Other signiicant groups 
include: Shilluk – 4.1%; Bari – 4%; Firtit – 3.2%; Nuer – 2.3%; and Funj – 2%” 
(CARE et al 2003: 14). These igures indicate the diverse ethnic backgrounds of 
shantytown residents, and it represented a huge challenge for these disparate 
ethnic groups to live together in a new urban environment.
This urban environment required many resources and newly-acquired 
knowledge of the displaced Southern people, who had to change the way in 
which they built their homes and planned their streets, and also needed to 
learn how to deal with paperwork and bureaucratic procedures. Furthermore, 
15. The group included CARE, IOM (the International Organization for Migration) 
and the UNDP (the United Nations Development Programme). Their aim was to con-
duct a socio-economic/demographic survey of IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) in 
different areas of Khartoum. The sample population consisted of 1,800 households.
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they had to work collectively to provide their areas with basic services, 
besides learning different ways to protect ownership of their new suburban 
homes. The residents of the Southern Sudanese shantytowns were also forced 
to deal with the challenges of adapting to new livelihoods: many had been 
farmers, pastoralists, or a combination of the two in their areas of origin. The 
only way they could survive in Khartoum was to learn how to be workers in 
government institutions, or in small factories as unskilled labourers. 
Alternatively, they could choose to become part of the informal economy and 
work as small traders. The informal economy is the only economic arena in 
which the capacity for recruitment is unlimited, despite the risks of inancial 
stress and the restricted opportunities for advancement, but for many, there 
are often no other options. Southern Sudanese people frequently switch 
between informal activities, with careers that are often dependent upon trial 
and error. When a new, proitable business opportunity opens up, large num-
bers of people will switch to it, thereby swamping the market and reducing 
proits. Recent estimates of the size of the informal economy in Khartoum 
have put the igure at 45% of the working population (Pantuliano 2011: 15).
According to the ethnic hierarchy that prevails in the northern parts of 
Sudan, people from Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, and to a lesser 
extent those from Darfur, are considered by Northern Sudanese people to 
enjoy the lowest status, due to their different cultural features, such as reli-
gious or ethnic backgrounds. This is because the majority of people from 
these regions consider themselves as having African ethnic origins, while the 
majority of the population of North Sudan consider themselves as having Arab 
origins. Ja’aliyiin, Shaygiyya, and Danagla, the main ethnic groups in the Nile 
Valley (North Sudan), have dominated the Sudanese State since the pre-colo-
nial period, particularly since the introduction of Islam and Arabism to Sudan 
in the sixteenth century, accompanied by a bitter legacy of slavery. 
Historically, after the rise of the Funj Sultanate (1504-1820) and the Fur 
Kingdom 16 and the spread of Islam and the Arabic language in Northern 
Sudan, the slave-raiding frontier moved further south. The adoption of an 
Arab/Islamic identity by some Northern Sudanese groups became a major cri-
terion for differentiating themselves from the non-Muslim groups of the South 
and other areas of Sudan. The construction of any particular identity involves 
the development of speciic perceptions regarding others, and so the Arabized 
Northern Sudanese – who were fewer in number, but more powerful – 
adopted stigmatizing ethnic labels to refer to non-Muslim groups in the South. 
As such, the slave-raiding frontier was deined and maintained in ideological, 
ethnic, and geographical terms: the inhabitants of Dar Fertit, the Nuba 
16. Both kingdoms were ruled by non-Arab ethnic groups but adopted an Arabic/
Islamic ideology as the basis for their authority. 
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Mountains and the Upper Blue Nile became easy targets for slave traders from 
Northern Muslim groups (Sikainga 1996: 8). 
This inferior position was maintained and extended to the shantytown set-
tlers, and was consolidated by other urban factors (such as their high rate of 
illiteracy and poverty and their rural origins). This historical and social back-
ground means that relations between shantytown dwellers and the rest of the 
city’s population have always tended to be based upon a majority-minority 
hegemony, which has created a stereotypical image of shantytown residents 
as the most vulnerable and stigmatized segment of the population. Whenever 
Southern shantytown dwellers cross the invisible boundaries into other parts 
of Khartoum, they encounter signiicant barriers of enforced behavioural pat-
terns, stigma, and social values that remind them of their positions on the 
city’s ladder, and which both persuade and force them to adhere to their rural 
traditions and their ‘Southern Identity’. 17
One way to overcome these internal divides has been for the residents to 
broaden their deinitions of themselves and incorporate new ethnic groups 
under the umbrella of larger ethnic groups from their area of origin. This has 
meant that ethnicity in the shantytowns of Khartoum has come to have differ-
ent meanings and implications from the way it is understood in their rural 
home areas. If we look at all the large ethnic groups in the Khartoum shanty-
towns (including the Fur, ‘Southerners’, Nuba and Kalmba 18), we see that 
none of them directly resemble their counterpart identities in their home-
lands; ‘Khartoum’ identities are sometimes non-existent in these home areas, 
having been invented to satisfy the urban needs of the local population 
(Bakhit 2015: 29).
17. An in-depth analysis has been carried out on the construction of identity and 
different lifestyles of the shantytown population in Khartoum, including the Southern 
Sudanese, according to which there are three basic lifestyle groups in the shanty-
towns: the irst generation, educated people, and the second generation. These life-
style groups have formed as a direct result of the speciic variables that created the 
shantytown settlement. The social groups are based upon certain ways of life pursued 
by their members. For further details, see Bakhit, Mohamed (2015). Identity and 
Lifestyles Construction in Multi-Ethnic Shantytowns: A Case Study of Al-Baraka 
Community in Khartoum, Sudan. LIT Verlag: Berlin.
18. Kalmba includes several ethnic groups from Western Sudan; other ethnic groups 
describe them as people who have migrated from Chad to Sudan.
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THE PROS AND CONS OF ‘COMMUNITY’ CITIZENSHIP 
Questions still remain to be answered on the extent to which this ‘com-
munity’ citizenship is giving people what they need, and how far it can 
protect them. 
Apparently, ‘community’ citizenship status for Southern Sudanese people 
in Khartoum is operating as a substitute for their lack of legal citizenship. On 
the one hand, the South Sudanese in Khartoum are not legal citizens, but nor 
do they have clear refugee status, which places them in a very ambiguous sit-
uation not only for senior politicians but also for the low-level oficials with 
whom Southern people usually interact in government institutions. On the 
other hand, however, the Southern Sudanese who have returned to Khartoum 
from South Sudan or have stayed all along are beneiting from their long expe-
rience and the social networks they have been able to build in Khartoum 
while they have been living in the city. 19 Through their knowledge of the city’s 
geography, culture, and economic opportunities, therefore, it is not especially 
hard for Southern Sudanese people to navigate their lives, albeit with rather 
more dificulty than was the case before the independence of South Sudan. 
They have now largely lost ownership of their homes, 20 and have lost their 
jobs in public and private institutions, although they still have the ability to 
work in the informal economy, as is especially the case with women who 
work as domestic workers in neighbouring areas. 
All of this suggests a reliance on the part of the Southern Sudanese on a 
new type of status that does not belong to any formal set of legal deinitions 
(such as citizen, refugee, or IDP), but has been appropriated and established 
through their lengthy social and economic experience in Khartoum. This 
‘community’ citizenship status therefore differs in terms of its dynamics and 
evolution, in that it is negotiated, constructed, and communicated on a daily 
basis through the interactions among different, but related, groups (returnees 
from South Sudan, South Sudanese who stayed in Khartoum, old neighbours 
in shantytowns, old friends from Sudan, and old work colleagues).
‘Community’ citizenship status therefore gives Southern Sudanese people 
fewer rights than they had when they were citizens of Sudan, but has still ena-
bled the Southern Sudanese in Khartoum to live and survive with at least the 
19. Multiple interviews with Southern Sudanese who live in the Al-Baraka area, 
Khartoum, May-June 2016.
20. Southern Sudanese people acquired ownership of their homes as a part of the plan-
ning and legalization of what had previously been squatter settlements during 1980s 
and 1990s. For further details, see Bakhit, Mohamed (2013). “From illegal squatter 
settlement towards legal shantytowns: negotiations of power and responsibilities in 
Khartoum shantytowns”. In BIGSAS Working Papers 4/2013. pp. 7-21. Also available 
online on https://epub.uni-bayreuth.de/113/1/BIGSASworks_4_05oct2013.pdf 
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minimum standards of Khartoum’s shantytowns, and more importantly has 
provided the Southern Sudanese people with the security and protection from 
violence they lack in South Sudan at the current time.  
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to look at the processes of citizenship changes for a 
group of South Sudanese people who have remained residents of Khartoum, 
as “the production of concepts of membership, their legalisation and, cur-
rently, their so-called lexibilisation and renegotiation have been the 
paramount themes in recent analyses of the changing nature of citizenship. Its 
‘lexibilisation’ relates to both membership practices and the legal regimes 
differentiating the allocation of rights (and duties) according to criteria other 
than those of territoriality, such as economic proit or ‘blood’” (Julia, 2011, 
311). The paper has employed the concept of ‘community’ citizenship as an 
alternative to the conventional concept of legal citizenship, which usually 
dominates the literature on the South Sudan secession of 2011.
Given the recent political crisis that has devastated the newly-established 
country of South Sudan (December 2013, July 2016), the impact of the cur-
rent conlict on the perceptions and expressions of South Sudanese national 
identity and the settlement preferences of the Southern Sudanese, the rela-
tions between the neighbouring countries, and the decision taken by Southern 
Sudanese in Khartoum as to whether to stay or return are all important issues 
that will require further investigation. This has become all the more necessary 
in the light of the Cooperation Agreement of 27 September 2012 between 
Sudan and South Sudan, as a part of which Sudan and South Sudan have rati-
ied a Framework Agreement that includes, inter alia, the Four Freedoms 
Agreement, which is intended to grant nationals of each State freedom of resi-
dence, movement, and economic activity, and the right to acquire and dispose 
of property in the territory of the other State. 
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